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Cherlin Weekend at Rutgers

Rutgers University will hold a conference in honor of Professor Gregory Cherlin on September 30 – October 2, 2016. Details are available here. Due to this meeting and the DART VII conference, there will be no Logic Workshop on September 30. For those not going to Rutgers, do notice the NY Group Theory Seminar talk by Miasnikov, announced below.

Reconciling Nominalism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics

FRIDAY APRIL 22 (Philosophy Hall, Room 716)

14:00–14:15
Achille Varzi (Columbia University), Marco Panza (IHPST)
Welcome and Introduction
14:15-15:45
John Burgess (Princeton University)
Reconciling Anti-Nominalism and Anti-Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
15:45–16:00 Break
16:00-17:30
Haim Gaifman (Columbia University)
Reconfiguring the Problem: “Platonism” as Objective, Evidence-transcendent Truth
17:30-19:00
Sébastien Gandon (Université Blaise Pascal)
Describing What One is Doing. A Philosophy of Action Based View of Mathematical Objectivity

SATURDAY, APRIL 23 (Philosophy Hall, Room 716)

9:30–11:00
Mirna Džamonja (University of East Anglia and IHPST)
An Unreasonable Effectiveness of ZFC Set Theory at the Singular Cardinals
11:00–11:30 Break
11:30–13:00
Hartry Field (New York University)
Platonism, Indispensability, Conventionalism
13:00–15:00 Lunch
15:00-16:30
Justin Clarke-Doane (Columbia University)
The Benacerraf Problem in Broader Perspective
16:30–17:00 Break
17:00-18:30
Michele Friend (George Washington University)
Is the Pluralist Reconciliation between Nominalism and Platonism too Easy?
18:30 Conclusions

Plural Logic and Sensitivity to Order

David Nicolas, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris

 

David.Nicolas_s2

 

Sentences that exhibit sensitivity to order (e.g. “John and Mary arrived at school in that order” and “Mary and John arrived at school in that order”) present a challenge for the standard formulation of plural logic. In response, some authors have advocated new versions of plural logic based on more fine-grained notions of plural reference, such as serial reference (Hewitt 2012) and articulated reference (Ben-Yami 2013). The aim of this work is to show that sensitivity to order should be accounted for without altering the standard formulation of plural logic. In particular, sensitivity to order does not call for a more fine-grained notion of plural reference. We point out that the phenomenon in question is quite broad and that current proposals are not equipped to deal with the full range of cases in which order plays a role. Then we develop an alternative, unified account, which locates the phenomenon not in the way in which plural terms can refer, but in the meaning of special expressions such as “in that order” and “respectively”.

Welcome to the Set Theory seminar Spring 2014

The set theory seminar will be coordinated in Spring 2014 by Thomas Johnstone.

Tom pointed out that it’s been about ten years that we have been having our weekly Set Theory seminar at CUNY, starting with a few of Joel Hamkins’s graduate students who met on a weekly basis (George, Jonas, Victoria, and himself), and we’ve had many interesting seminar meetings since then.

 

At this point the schedule is wide open, so please let Tom know if you’d be interested to give a talk.