Topic Archive: paraconsistent logics
In this talk I will critically discuss some widely shared methodological assumptions about paraconsistent logic. I will argue that there exist several reasons not to consider classical logic as the reference logic for developing systems of paraconsistent logic and will suggest to weaken a certain maximality condition. Moreover, I will argue that the guiding motivation for the development of paraconsistent logics should be neither epistemological nor ontological, but informational, and I will, from this perspective, discuss the idea of “ex contradictione nihil sequitur”.
Paraconsistent justification logics are justification logic systems for inconsistent beliefs or commitments. In other words, these systems are intended to model the agent’s justification structure, when she has inconsistent beliefs or commitments.
Realization theorem is one important meta-theorem in the discourse of justification logic. Quasi-realization theorem can be taken to be a major step toward proving realization theorem. In the last semester, I introduced one paraconsistent justification logic, called PJ_b. The main focus of the talk on the coming Tuesday is quasi-realization. It will be proved that quasi-realization theorem – which holds for standard justification logic systems – also holds for PJ_b.