# Blog Archives

# Topic Archive: philosophical logic

# Generic logical semantics of justifications.

Proofs and justification are gradually making their way from meta-logical notions into the formal logic itself and becoming mathematical logical objects. This makes the logic language (much) more precise and connects the logic apparatus to numerous new areas of interest. In this talk, we describe a generic logical semantics of justifications within the classical truth values logic framework: justifications here appear as sets of formulas with appropriate closure conditions.

# Measure semantics for modal logics

Long before Kripke semantics became standard in modal logic, Tarski showed us that the basic propositional modal language can be interpreted in topological spaces. In Tarski’s semantics for the modal logic $S4$, each propositional variable is evaluated to an arbitrary subset of a fixed topological space. I develop a related, measure theoretic semantics, in which modal formulas are interpreted in the Lebesgue measure algebra, or algebra of Borel subsets of the real interval $[0,1]$, modulo sets of measure zero. This semantics was introduced by Dana Scott in the last several years. I discuss some of my own completeness results, and ways of extending the semantics to more complex modal languages.

# Satisfaction is not absolute

I will discuss a number of theorems showing that the satisfaction relation of first-order logic is less absolute than might have been supposed. Two models of set theory $M_1$ and $M_2$, for example, can agree on their natural numbers $langlemathbb{N},{+},{cdot},0,1,{lt}rangle^{M_1}=langlemathbb{N},{+},{cdot},0,1,{lt}rangle^{M_2}$, yet disagree on arithmetic truth: they have a sentence $sigma$ in the language of arithmetic that $M_1$ thinks is true in the natural numbers, yet $M_2$ thinks $negsigma$ there. Two models of set theory can agree on the natural numbers $mathbb{N}$ and on the reals $mathbb{R}$, yet disagree on projective truth. Two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and have a computable linear order in common, yet disagree about whether this order is well-ordered. Two models of set theory can have a transitive rank initial segment $V_delta$ in common, yet disagree about whether this $V_delta$ is a model of ZFC. The theorems are proved with elementary classical methods.

This is joint work with Ruizhi Yang (Fudan University, Shanghai). We argue, on the basis of these mathematical results, that the definiteness of truth in a structure, such as with arithmetic truth in the standard model of arithmetic, cannot arise solely from the definiteness of the structure itself in which that truth resides; rather, it must be seen as a separate, higher-order ontological commitment.